PORT ANGELES. Four days before his protection-order hearing, Anthony Tomashefsky sent an email to the Clallam County court administrator announcing that Washington's anti-SLAPP statute barred the court from proceeding, and declaring that the hearing "must be stricken." He then did not attend it.
The court's answer came in writing. On August 27, 2025, the day after granting Benjamin Mavy a stalking and anti-harassment protection order against Tomashefsky in case No. 25-2-00595-05. Court Commissioner Brian Parker filed a memorandum opinion and order that methodically dismantles the statutory theory Tomashefsky had asserted by email.
The claim
The opinion opens by framing the motion before it: "This matter came before the court on the Petitioner's petition for protection order, and the Respondent's motion for a continuance."
"Respondent has asserted this matter may not go forward under RCW 4.105, the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA)," Parker wrote. "An email was sent to court administration noting his intent to file a UPEPA action, and stating the court was barred from proceeding with the hearing on the protection order. I disagree."
UPEPA is Washington's version of an anti-SLAPP law, a statute designed to quickly dispose of litigation that targets people for speaking out on matters of public concern. Invoking it, Tomashefsky was arguing in effect that a stalking and harassment case against him was really an attack on his speech.
The three-part answer
Parker's opinion gives three reasons the argument failed.
First, timing. "RCW 7.105.040 makes it clear continuances are disfavored," he wrote, noting that the protection-order statute "formally recognizes that petitioners in protection order actions have an interest in 'proceeding expeditiously with litigation and the potential prejudice and risk to petitioners of a delay.'"
Second, the statute itself. "The UPEPA clearly states it doesn't apply to protection orders," Parker wrote. "See RCW 4.105.010(3)(a)(ix) and the Reviser's note." The subsection he cited expressly excludes orders for anti-harassment protection under chapter 7.105 RCW from the anti-SLAPP law's reach, the Legislature having written protection-order cases out of the statute.
Third, procedure. "Finally, the court doubts an email to court administration sufficiently satisfies the formal notice requirements of RCW 4.105," the opinion states. "However, since that statute clearly states it does not apply to protection order proceedings, I do not need to decide that issue."
The duty to appear
The opinion's sharpest passage addresses what Tomashefsky did instead of arguing his theory in court: nothing.
"While Respondent can request a continuance, the court may grant limited continuances only after weighing the Petitioner's interest in proceeding expeditiously," Parker wrote. "This request for a continuance does not relieve the Respondent of their duty to appear at the hearing to secure the hearing, accept service of the reissued order, and engage with the court and petitioner to choose the date for the next hearing."
Then the finding of fact: "Respondent did not attend the hearing on this matter. Consequently, a decision was rendered on the records and pleadings on file herein."
Court records show Tomashefsky had been warned this would happen. According to Judge W. Brent Basden's later memorandum opinion, the court administrator, acting at the judge's direction, informed Tomashefsky on August 25 "that an email to the Court Administrator does not change court dates," and that he could schedule a hearing or appear at the one already set to request a continuance.
Affirmed on review
Tomashefsky pressed the UPEPA argument again in his motion for revision. On October 21, 2025, Judge Basden rejected it a second time, writing that "[u]nder subsection (3)(a)(ix), the provisions of RCW 4.105 do not apply to an order for antiharassment under RCW 7.105," and observing that Tomashefsky "chose not to appear at the hearing and argue the applicability of RCW 4.105." Basden added: "Respondent provides no authority for the position that a person seeking a protection order can be denied protection during the time it takes a respondent to file their RCW 4.105 motion and have a hearing."
Parker, the author of the August 27 opinion, was Clallam County's family law court commissioner, an appointed judicial officer selected by the Superior Court bench in September 2024 after roughly sixteen years of licensed practice, including prior service as a Snohomish County commissioner pro tempore. His memorandum in this case is a public record, and its central holding is a matter of statutory text rather than discretion: Washington's anti-SLAPP law, by its own terms, "doesn't apply to protection orders."
The protection order the statute failed to stop remains in effect through August 26, 2027.
This article relies on public court records and public complaints. TROH welcomes a response from Mr. Tomashefsky and will publish it in full.